Victory of 15th August Was a Reality or a Bargain—How Did the Afghan National Army’s Sun-Set?
In reality, the Taliban’s return to power was facilitated by a negotiated process, most notably through the Doha Agreement deal signed with the United States in February 2020
Introduction
15 August, 2021 stands as a significant and tragic milestone in Afghanistan’s turbulent history. On this day, the capital city of Kabul and other provinces fell to the Taliban, marking the end of a 20-year chapter of U.S.-led intervention and its allies and the swift collapse of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The speed and ease with which the Taliban re-captured Kabul stunned the world, raising profound questions about the causes and underlying reasons for the ANA’s failure to defend the nation.
Three years later, it is crucial to critically analyze the factors that led to the disintegration of the ANA and the broader implications of this momentous event. The fall of Kabul was not just a result of battlefield losses but the culmination of deep-rooted issues within Afghanistan’s security apparatus, coupled with strategic errors and a failure to understand the complex dynamics at play. So, this essay delves into the causes, motives, and reasons behind the ANA’s collapse, exploring how and why this once formidable force crumbled under pressure, leading to one of the most consequential geopolitical shifts of the 21st century.
Historical Context
To understand the fall or deal of Kabul and Afghanistan, it is essential to consider the broader context of Afghanistan’s history, particularly the U.S.-led intervention and its allies following the 9/11 attacks. The United States and its NATO allies entered Afghanistan with the primary objective of dismantling al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power, and also there was the matter of bin Laden. Over the next two decades, billions of dollars were poured into rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure, establishing democratic institutions, and, notably, training and equipping the Afghan National Army (Collins, 2021).
The ANA was envisioned as a professional, national force capable of defending Afghanistan from internal and external threats. However, despite the substantial investment, the ANA’s effectiveness was consistently undermined by issues such as corruption, poor leadership, lack of cohesion, and a reliance on foreign support. Ethnic, racial, and religious discrimination was another weakness in the Afghan national army. These weaknesses became particularly evident as the U.S. and NATO began to withdraw their forces, leading to the rapid deterioration of the Afghan security situation.
Causes of the ANA’s Collapse
Overdependence on U.S. Support: One of the primary causes of the ANA’s collapse was its overdependence on U.S. military support and its allies in logistics, training, and combat capabilities. The ANA heavily relied on U.S. airpower for close air support, reconnaissance, and medevac operations. When the U.S. and NATO began to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan and significantly reduced their air support, the ANA was left without the critical support needed to conduct effective operations against the Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, the Afghan forces were accustomed to operating under U.S. military advisers’ direct guidance and coordination. The sudden removal of this support structure left a vacuum that the ANA was ill-prepared to fill. Without the technical expertise and command-and-control infrastructure the U.S. and NATO provided, the ANA struggled to maintain operational cohesion, contributing to its rapid disintegration (Rubin, 2021).
Corruption and Poor Leadership
Corruption was rampant within the Afghan government and military, severely undermining the effectiveness of the ANA. Many high-ranking and low-ranking officers, commanders, also small and large high-ranking and low-ranking employees were appointed based on political, ethnic, and racial connections rather than merit, leading to a lack of competent leadership within the ranks. This resulted in widespread inefficiencies, including misallocating resources, selling military equipment on the black market, and manipulating troop numbers (known as “ghost soldiers”) to siphon off salaries.
Poor leadership also manifested in the troops’ inability to inspire loyalty and morale. Soldiers, often unpaid or underpaid, lacked the motivation to fight for a government that many perceived as corrupt and disconnected from their daily struggles. The leadership’s failure to address these issues led to widespread desertions and defections to the Taliban, further weakening the ANA’s combat effectiveness (Gopal, 2021).
Ethnic Divisions and Lack of Cohesion
Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country with a complex social fabric. The ANA, intended to be a national force, often reflected the ethnic divisions present in Afghan society. Despite efforts to create a unified army, ethnic tensions persisted, leading to a lack of cohesion within the ranks. The Taliban, on the other hand, was more successful in presenting itself as a united force, albeit primarily Pashtun and Pashtunism, which helped their fighters and insurgents gain support across various regions.
The ANA’s inability to function as a cohesive unit was further exacerbated by the Taliban’s strategic exploitation of these ethnic divisions. The Taliban effectively used propaganda to sow distrust between different ethnic groups within the ANA, eroding the already fragile sense of national unity. This division contributed to the ANA’s rapid collapse as soldiers and officers, particularly those from minority ethnic groups, felt increasingly alienated and chose to abandon their posts rather than fight for a government they did not feel represented them (Jones, 2019).
The Doha Agreement and Its Psychological Impact
The Doha Agreement, signed between the United States and the Taliban in February 2020, played a significant role in the eventual fall or dealing of Kabul and Afghanistan. The agreement outlined the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan and set a timeline for this withdrawal. Although the agreement was intended to facilitate a peaceful transition and intra-Afghan dialogue, it had the unintended consequence of demoralizing the ANA and emboldening the Taliban.
The ANA, already struggling with low morale, interpreted the Doha Agreement as a sign of abandonment by their Western allies. The Taliban, on the other hand, saw the agreement as a victory, reinforcing their narrative that they had defeated a global superpower. This psychological shift was critical in the months leading up to the fall of Kabul, as the Taliban intensified their military campaign, taking advantage of the ANA’s deteriorating morale and cohesion.
The Afghan government’s exclusion from the negotiations also undermined its legitimacy and further eroded trust in its leadership. The perception that the U.S. was negotiating directly with the Taliban without the Afghan government’s meaningful involvement weakened the government’s position and contributed to the sense of inevitability surrounding the Taliban’s return to power (Gopal, 2021).
Rapid Taliban Offensive and Strategic Calculations
In the months leading up to 15th August 2021, the Taliban launched a rapid and coordinated offensive across Afghanistan, capturing key provincial capitals with minimal resistance. The Taliban’s strategy of targeting rural areas first, then encircling and isolating urban centers, effectively cut off the ANA’s supply lines and eroded their capacity to mount a coordinated defense.
The ANA, stretched thin and demoralized, could not mount an effective counteroffensive. The Taliban’s and their supporter’s use of psychological warfare, including the spread of rumors about imminent Taliban victories and promises of amnesty for those who surrendered, further accelerated the ANA’s collapse. Many soldiers and local leaders, calculating that resistance was futile and seeking to protect their families, chose to surrender rather than fight.
The Afghan government’s failure to anticipate the speed and scale of the Taliban’s advance was another critical factor. As the Taliban captured territory at an unprecedented pace, the ANA and the Afghan government were left scrambling to respond. By the time the Taliban reached Kabul, the ANA was in disarray, and the government had lost control of the situation.
The Motivation for the Taliban’s Return to Afghanistan
The Taliban’s success in recapturing Kabul was driven by a combination of ideological commitment, effective strategic planning, and exploitation of the weaknesses within the Afghan government, dealing with the military, and also civilians. Unlike the ANA, the Taliban was highly motivated by its ideological commitment to re-establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. This ideological cohesion was a powerful force that united the Taliban’s ranks and sustained their long-term insurgency against Afghan women, girls, people, and societies.
The Taliban also benefited from effective strategic planning and a clear understanding of the weaknesses within the Afghan government and security forces. Their strategy of gradually encircling urban centers, cutting off supply lines, and using psychological warfare was highly influential in undermining the ANA’s ability to defend territory. The Taliban’s use of negotiations and promises of amnesty to encourage defections further weakened the ANA’s resolve.
Additionally, the Taliban’s ability to adapt and evolve over the years, learning from past mistakes, was a key factor in their return. Unlike the rigid and corrupt structures of the Afghan government and military, the Taliban operated with a decentralized command structure that allowed for flexibility and quick decision-making. This adaptability was crucial in their ability to launch a successful and rapid offensive in the final months leading up to the fall of Kabul (Jones, 2019).
The Broader Implications of Kabul’s Fall
The fall of Kabul and the collapse of the ANA have far-reaching implications for Afghanistan and the international community. For Afghanistan, the return of the Taliban has led to a rollback of many of the gains made in human rights, particularly for women and minorities. The country now faces a severe humanitarian crisis, with millions of people at risk of starvation and displacement. The international community, particularly the United States and its NATO allies, has faced significant criticism for the handling of the withdrawal and the subsequent collapse of the Afghan government and security forces. The chaotic scenes at Kabul airport, where thousands of Afghans desperately tried to flee the country, have become symbolic of the broader failure of the two-decade-long intervention in Afghanistan.
The fall of Kabul has also raised questions about the future of counterterrorism efforts in the region. With the Taliban back in power, there are concerns about the resurgence of extremist groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS-K, Lashkar-e-Taiba, TTP, and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan. So, the situation in Afghanistan remains highly volatile, with the potential for renewed conflict and instability that could have global implications. Also, the Taliban regime does not withhold anything from the people and women of Afghanistan, from bread to education and the persecution of ethnic and religious minorities (Gordon, 2022).
Why Does the Taliban Consider 15th August as Victory Day in Afghanistan?
The Taliban’s decision to declare 15th August a holiday and celebrate it as a “day of victory” over America or the West reflects a complex blend of propaganda, psychological strategy, and an effort to consolidate power by framing their return to Kabul as a triumph of their ideology over foreign intervention. However, this narrative is more symbolic than reflective of actual events leading to their return to power.
Propaganda and Psychological Strategy
The Taliban’s announcement of 15 August as a day of victory serves as a powerful propaganda tool. By framing the fall of Kabul as a victory over the United States and its allies, the Taliban seeks to solidify its domestic and international legitimacy. This narrative allows them to portray themselves as having successfully resisted and ultimately defeated a superpower, which resonates with their supporters and the broader population, particularly those disillusioned with the two decades of foreign presence in Afghanistan.
In reality, the Taliban’s return to power was facilitated by a negotiated process, most notably through the Doha Agreement deal signed with the United States in February 2020. This agreement outlined the withdrawal of U.S. forces and set the stage for the Taliban’s return, with the understanding that they would engage in intra-Afghan dialogue and refrain from hosting terrorist groups that could threaten the West.
Consolidation of Power and Ideological Messaging
Declaring 15th August as a holiday also serves to reinforce the Taliban’s ideological messaging. The date is used to celebrate not just a military victory but also the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which the Taliban views as a return to their vision of Islamic governance. By framing their takeover of Kabul as a divine victory, the Taliban seeks to legitimize their rule and assert their interpretation of Islam as the guiding principle of the state.
The Taliban’s leadership is aware that their rule is not universally accepted within Afghanistan. Many Afghans, particularly those in urban areas, who benefited from the freedoms and opportunities of the past two decades, are wary of the Taliban’s return. By celebrating 15th August, the Taliban aims to assert their authority and remind the population that they are now in control, regardless of the circumstances that brought them back to power.
Distortion of Historical Facts
The Taliban’s declaration of 15th August as a victory over America and the West involves a distortion of historical facts to fit their narrative. The reality is that the Taliban’s return to power was not achieved through a decisive military victory over U.S. forces, and also Afghan security forces but rather through a combination of negotiations, the withdrawal of international troops, and the collapse of the Afghan government and military. The Doha Agreement, which facilitated the U.S. withdrawal, was essentially a negotiated exit strategy rather than a surrender. It was an acknowledgment of the military and political realities on the ground, but it also reflected the broader U.S. strategy of shifting focus away from nation-building in Afghanistan.
By omitting these details and focusing solely on the image of the Taliban’s fighters entering Kabul, the group seeks to create a simplified, black-and-white narrative that ignores the complexities of the situation. This narrative is aimed at galvanizing their supporters and legitimizing their rule while glossing over the diplomatic and political processes that played a critical role in their return to power.
International Implications and Messaging
The Taliban’s portrayal of 15th August as a victory over America, the Western region, and the people of Afghanistan also serves an international purpose. It sends a message to other insurgent and extremist groups that persistence and ideological commitment can eventually lead to the withdrawal of foreign powers, reinforcing the narrative that military force and steadfastness can overcome even the most powerful adversaries. This message is likely intended to bolster the Taliban’s standing among similar groups and to position themselves as a leading force in the global jihadist movement.
At the same time, the Taliban’s focus on this narrative is a way to distract from the reality that their rule was largely facilitated by a withdrawal agreement that required them to make concessions, including commitments to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for terrorists. By emphasizing their “victory” over the U.S., western and Afghan security forces, and ANA, the Taliban seeks to maintain their revolutionary credentials while downplaying the compromises they made to regain power.
Conclusion
The third anniversary of the fall of Kabul is a somber reminder of the complexities and challenges of nation-building and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The collapse of the Afghan National Army on 15 August, 2021 was not the result of a single factor but rather a combination of deep-rooted issues within the Afghan state and military, strategic miscalculations by the international community, and the Taliban’s effective exploitation of these weaknesses. As the world reflects on this anniversary, it is essential to learn from the failures in Afghanistan to better understand the challenges of stabilizing conflict-ridden regions and to avoid repeating the same mistakes in the future.
The legacy of the fall of Kabul will continue to shape the geopolitical landscape for years to come, and its lessons must not be forgotten. The Taliban’s declaration of 15th August as a holiday celebrating victory over American, western, and Afghan security forces is a carefully constructed narrative that serves multiple purposes. It is a propaganda tool designed to legitimize their rule, a psychological strategy to reinforce their authority, and an ideological statement to assert their vision of governance. While the Taliban’s return to power was the result of a complex interplay of military, political, and diplomatic factors.
